any basis other than principle. It must, without denying the importance of the emotional and the spiritual, have a high regard for rationality as the primary faculty by which we can comprehend man's essentially tragic condition.

And then there is the factor of time. It is paradoxically true that an excess of virtue may produce a vice. And this is sometimes true in our American attitude toward time. So eager are we, and properly so, to correct errors, to make progess, that we sometimes forget that some growth simply demands time.

A plant gains no health and vigor if it is pulled from the ground periodically to note the condition of its roots. A university, in particular, does not achieve excellence overnight. Recall that while many of the American universities which we now revere came into being in the 17th and 18th centuries, as late as the latter part of the 19th they were characterized by Dean Andrew West, of Princeton as mainly institutions "with some anticipations of university studies toward the end of the course."

There is of course a danger here. If brash and imprudent impatience is a danger, complacency is its equal. Between Scylla and Charybdis the wise must steer.

The community desiring excellence in its higher learning must know a great deal about the special nature of a university. A university is the most perplexing, frustrating, difficult, and wonderful social institution devised by man. And it is all of these things because it exists for paradoxical ends. It is inevitable that universities should occupy an ambivalent place in a society even though that society creates, supports, and at times praises them. A university is established by a society to insure that the values to which that social order subscribes are perpetuated; there is, in effect, an orthodoxy at stake. And yet, in its rarer moments society also acknowledges that it is equally important to examine and, indeed, to modify that orthodoxy. Thus the university is mandated to question the value system which it is also supposed to preserve. Problems inevitably arise, however, from the fact that the whole society does not uniformly subscribe to both these ends. There are always some to whom it appears that the university ought to be preserving instead of questioning. And to others the reverse is true. This is why universities are so often misunderstood by the society which sustains them. This is why a public university is not like any other agency of Government and cannot be so regarded if it is to achieve the excellence of its nature. And the proper treatment of a university cannot await universal agreement that it has achieved excellence, for the former is a prior and necessary condition of the latter.

The only proper stance for a university as it faces the paradox of its nature is the fundamental premise of the vocation of scholarship: That truth is always preferable to error. This does not mean that at all times the university can be confident it possesses the truth. A little humility here would help. With the best of intentions, universities have, with all their solemnity and tradition, taught error, whether it be the astronomy of Ptolemy or the theory of ether. But the validity of the premise is not by such facts disproved.

Finally, it seems to me that no good university can exist unless it contains within itself a sense of purposiveness which is shared by all who make up the university community. It must know its nature, it must know its purposes, it must know the needed means, and it must have a plan which relates means to its purposes. The possibilities of planning can, of course, be overemphasized. What physics department chairman in 1940 could have foretold his need for a reactor and an accelerator just 10 years later? But the university must develop the general sense of direction related to time and means. If it does not, others will do the job and understandably so.

Keeping all these matters firmly in mind is perhaps most difficult in an institution such as this. This is the people's university. Being such it must be both responsible to the society of which it is a part and responsive to the needs of the peoples of that society. But this does not mean that it should sway with each new gust of the wind of public opinion. At times it will best serve the people by saying "no." And it need not be too concerned at the criticism which then ensues. One of the remarkable things about good universities is that their record of survival is far better than that of the particular societies which first established them.

These remarks may seem sobering. They were meant to be. It does no good for either you or me to underestimate the magnitude of the task with which we jointly are confronted. And yet I am not pessimistic. Given determination, we can, I think, by combining the assets of the State with Federal assistance, and a great increase in private giving, muster the resources necessary. Time is always available for wise use, use which avoids both imprudence and complacency. I shall use my influence, as others have and will, to see that the university exhibits poise and maturity and self-respect. We can hope with some confidence that the proper nature of a university becomes increasingly clear, and concern with purpose and means will be at the university a first order of business.

It is important that this be done. Given a society, such as ours, dedicated to human dignity and the equality of men, a society which must remain free and open, safe and productive, there exists no better investment than a university of quality. For it is a great university which can make of our society what Athens was in the eyes of Socrates. Maxwell Anderson described that vision in these words which I have quoted before, which I shall quote again, and with which I close: "Athens has always seemed to me a sort of mad miracle of a city, flashing out in all directions, a great city for no discoverable reason. But now I see that Athens is driven and made miraculous by the same urge that has sent me searching your streets. It is the Athenian search for truth, the Athenian hunger for facts, the endless curiosity of the Athenian mind, that has made Athens unlike any other city. This is a city drenched with light—the light of frank and restless inquiry—and this light has flooded every corner of our lives: our courts, our theaters, our athletic games, our markets—even the open architecture of the temples of our gods. This has been our genius—a genius for light * * *. Shut out the light and close our minds and we shall be like a million cities of the past that came up out of mud, and worshipped darkness a little while, and went back, forgotten, into darkness."

A KEY TO VICTORY IN VIETNAM—OUR DETERMINATION TO SUCCEED

Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, last December, the very distinguished Senator from the State of Washington [Mr. JACKSON], one of our ranking members of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, visited South Vietnam at the invitation of the Secretary of the Army, Cyrus R. Vance, for a close look at the counterinsurgency program.

During this visit, the Senator from Washington conferred with many hundreds of persons—American and Vietnamese Government officials; American and Vietnamese officers and men in the field.

The March 1963 issue of the Army magazine has a special report submitted by U.S. Senator HENRY M. JACKSON on his South Vietnam visit.

I most respectfully feel that the Senator's candid observations on the counterinsurgency program is worthy of our serious consideration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have Senator JACKSON'S special report entitled "A Key to Victory in Vietnam" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A KEY TO VICTORY IN VIETNAM—OUR DETERMINATION TO SUCCEED

(By Senator HENRY M. JACKSON)

The struggle in South Vietnam, with all its frustrations and vexations, is the kind of effort the U.S. Army will be making for a long time. We have got to get used to that idea.

In Communist jargon this is a "war of national liberation"—the kind of war that Khrushchev and Mao think they can win. More than 2 years ago Khrushchev pledged that he would wage such struggles in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. We have got to take him seriously. There are signs aplenty that he has other such ventures in mind—perhaps some in our own backyard.

This is not war on a large scale, involving the movement of big units, heavy firepower, sustained combat, and well-defined fronts. Militarily it is a war of skirmishes and ambushes, hit-and-run attacks, with the enemy breaking off contact when opposed and filtering away into the rice paddies or the jungle. Politically it is a war to destroy the confidence of the people in their government, to build up such physical exhaustion and such war-weariness that the will to resist will be eroded, and to create the fear and uncertainty which will pave the way for any regime which can promise order, no matter the terms.

The Chinese Communists have been perfecting this type of warfare for more than a generation. We have got to learn to combat it in a fraction of the time. The encouraging fact about the struggle in South Vietnam is that we are learning.

Because the experience in South Vietnam has much to teach us, I wanted to see it for myself and was privileged to spend 8 days there last December at the invitation of Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance. Along the way I stopped to talk with Admiral Felt in Hawaii, and in Saigon I talked with Ambassador Nolting and the key members of the country team. I was accompanied by Col. George B. Sloan, chief of the U.S. Army congressional liaison and inquiry division, who had had a chance to study the situation there on an earlier trip in October. Together we visited a number of units in the field, talking with the officers in South Vietnamese units and their American advisers. I also had a number of talks with high officials of the Vietnamese government, including Premier Diem and his brother and close adviser, Nu.

Of course, I spent a good deal of time in discussions with Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Maj. Gen. Charles J. Timmes, chief of the MAAG, Brig. Gen. Joe Stilwell, Jr., the Army support commander, and Col. George Morton, who is directing our Special Forces opera-

tions. From my own personal standpoint the visits to the field, with opportunities to observe combat operations and conditions, were the highlights of the trip.

The first thing to observe is that our effort in Vietnam involves all elements of our Government. State, AID, USIA, CIA, and the military all have their parts to play—and all must be played well.

The second point to be made is that our effort in South Vietnam is closely related to the situation in the rest of southeast Asia, especially Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. It is not possible, I am sure, to conduct a wise policy in Vietnam in isolation from our policies in southeast Asia as a whole.

I have often heard it said in a critical tone of voice, that we should send our best people overseas on tasks like this one. I am prepared to testify that we have a splendid group of Americans in South Vietnam, and we back home can and should take pride in them and their efforts. They are mature, competent, and realistic. They show a real sensitivity to the nature of the struggle in which they are engaged. They have good morale and preserve a good American sense of humor—qualities that are as important as they are remarkable when one is living knee-deep in water, as many of our advisers are. These comments apply not only to the Army personnel, but also to the Embassy, the Aid, and USIA missions, the Marines, Air Force, and Navy, and others. A lot of credit goes to General Harkins and Ambassador Nolting for creating a real team effort—of the kind that we are going to be called on to make elsewhere. It is good to know that it can be done when you have the right people with the right spirit.

Of special interest to the Army, and something Army officers will be studying with great care, is the role of the helicopter and slow, highly versatile, fixed-wing aircraft like the Caribou. Together with good communications, so that one has up-to-the-minute information on where the Viet Cong are, this equipment gives the South Vietnamese forces an advantage in terms of ability to move quickly and concentrate that is probably the key factor in turning the tide in Vietnam.

The sky is a highway without roadblocks. The helicopter frees the Government forces from dependence on the poor road system and the canals which are the usual arteries of communication. It enables them to achieve surprise. I think of it as a cavalry of the air—with all of the advantages and more that cavalry used to give in combat with an enemy on foot. There is still a lot to learn, but our people are learning fast. One place where we can improve is to supply more of these craft and to improve our maintenance.

The new Army is a lot more than a well-trained group of fighting men. American personnel are living, for example, with peasants in the Delta and with mountain people, or Montagnards, in the high country. Wherever they are, they are teaching—and they are learning. And the latter is probably more difficult than the former, for an American is inclined to doubt that a primitive tribesman has much to teach him. But these do, and we can learn just as our forefathers learned a lot from the Indian about survival in the wilderness.

Our men are doing a marvelous job of establishing personal links with the people. I saw American soldiers helping with the construction of huts, simple schoolrooms, community facilities, and the simple but effective fortifications around the so-called strategic hamlets. A good many have learned some words of the native dialects and a good many are teaching English to the villagers. In one unit I met a noncom who had been up all night helping with the delivery of a baby. In short, the American soldier has a kind of "peace corps" of his own—but in this peace corps one carries his rifle on his shoulder, for the crackle of gunfire may interrupt any task.

For this is a struggle in which blood is being spilled. Last year the South Vietnamese suffered more than 11,000 casualties. According to the official estimates the Vietcong had 28,000. Admiral Felt estimates that the enemy is making about 50 armed attacks a month at the present time, which is about half the number a year ago. So progress is being made, thanks in large part to the effectiveness of U.S. Army advisers, who serve not only at corps and divisional headquarters but down to the battalion level. As our casualty lists show, a good many advisers have been in the thick of operations, which often involve units of platoon or squad size.

Large areas of the delta and the high plateau and mountain country in the north have been in Vietcong hands since shortly after World War II. In fact, Vietnam has never been truly unified in modern times. The Government therefore must not only try to protect the country against guerilla attacks but also carry out an effort to establish its authority and legitimacy in areas where it has never been recognized. To win the loyalty and support of the people and to build a sense of statehood where none has existed are difficult tasks in the best of circumstances. Probably the remarkable thing is how much has been accomplished along this line.

The Communists control nearly half of the countryside and nearly half of the villagers, who make up almost 90 percent of the population. In the areas that they dominate, the Vietcong collect taxes, highway tolls, and contributions of food and supplies from the peasants.

It is still not safe to venture far from Saigon without an armed convoy. The railroads have to be protected from sabotage and ambush and train service and other ground transport are frequently interrupted.

Why are we involved? Not just because Vietnam is a potentially rich country, though it is that. More because its loss would be an important political and psychological victory for the Communists, helping to confirm in their minds that the tide is running their way in Asia and that the West really has no answer to the war of national liberation.

But mostly for the simplest of all reasons: the Communists have got to be stopped. And they have got to be stopped where they make their effort. There isn't any nice, pleasant battleground where we could make a stand in preference to this one.

Since my return I have been asked many times how the struggle is going. Are we winning? When will it end?

The honest answer is that no one can be certain whether he is winning. It isn't that kind of a fight. It doesn't oppose large, organized units. It doesn't have clearly defined fronts. It won't end with a surrender ceremony. What we hope for, and have a chance of achieving, is that it will peter out—the attacks will become less frequent, the Vietcong will find it more difficult to recruit, the supporters of the Government will gain confidence, and one day the enemy will slink away into the swamps and not return, or return as a defector.

By such measures as we have, the trends are favorable at this time; the tide seems to be turning. Viet Cong casualties are up; losses of Government equipment are down; captures of Viet Cong supplies are up; the number of armed attacks is declining; the number of strategic hamlets is increasing; and so on.

But optimism even of this kind has to be qualified. Of course ups and downs around this trend have to be expected, and we should not be surprised by setbacks or read too much significance into one or two spectacular victories. Furthermore, the basic trend could be reversed if the Viet Cong receives stepped-up assistance from the north, Red China, or the Soviet Union.

And it would be reversed if events go badly in Laos and Cambodia. In all frankness the prospect in these neighboring countries is not good. The "neutralist" government of Cambodia is leaning with the wind—and it thinks the wind is blowing from the north. The so-called coalition government in Laos was a marked child from its birth. It will be little short of miraculous if it can preserve effective neutrality in the struggle that rages in and around it.

In these circumstances the U.S. Government must take a long, hard look once again at its policies in southeast Asia. What are the areas that must be genuinely, not just nominally, denied to the Communists if the security of South Vietnam is to be safeguarded? Obviously, or so it seems to me, the area along the Mekong River, in what might be called the panhandle of Laos, is of key importance. If this area is, in fact, denied the Communists—that is, neutralized in the full sense of the word—this will have great meaning for the position of Cambodia, Vietnam, Thialand, and even Burma. If it is not, that will have other, grave implications.

We must look also at the intensity and adequacy of our efforts in South Vietnam. The road ahead is probably long and hard. We must be prepared for that. But the journey may be shortened and the burdens lightened if we approach the task with the determination to succeed and ask ourselves what is needed for success. Perhaps the question of determination is the key question.

It is just possible that with a few more shoves, we might get a bandwagon rolling. Little successes can lead in this situation to more and bigger victories. Confidence in the government could grow rapidly once it is evident that the government is beginning to get the upper hand.

For this reason this seems to me a psychologically opportune moment to step up the scale and intensity of our programs in all reasonable ways.

MAJ. LEROY GORDON COOPER, JR.

Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, on May 18, 1963 the people of Hawaii gave Maj. Leroy Gordon Cooper, Jr., a tremendous reception, second only to that given the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt when he visited the islands.

In welcoming Major Cooper, Gov. John A. Burns, of Hawaii, gave the following public remarks, which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WELCOME REMARKS BY GOV. JOHN A. BURNS ON ARRIVAL OF MAJ. L. GORDON COOPER, JR., HICKAM AIR FORCE BASE, MAY 18, 1963

Major Cooper, it is always a great pleasure to welcome distinguished guests to Hawaii. It is doubly pleasurable, in your case, because we regard you as a hometown boy—a native son of Hawaii.

You have traveled a greater distance than any other person in history to reach our islands. We, therefore, hope your short stay with us will be as memorable for you as it will be for us in having you here.

There are cherished events in the lives of all of us. In your case, I am sure that two such events are linked with Hawaii: first, your marriage to your very lovely wife, here